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SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE SURROGATE'S
COURTS
MARGARET VALENTINE TURANO
INTRODUCTION

When the Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development put out a
call to the St. John's faculty for papers for this symposium, I knew I
wanted to participate. How interesting, I thought, to view our respective
disciplines through the lens of racial, social and economic justice. My area
of expertise is Trusts & Estates, and at first blush the link between Trusts &
Estates and social justice may seem attenuated, but the Surrogate's Courts
are always abuzz with fiduciary issues, where one person is entrusted to
safeguard another's interests, and in that context issues of social justice
bubble up regularly, especially because ours is an immigrant society with
wildly varied and quickly changing demographics.
The scope of our task was narrow, so I have chosen two topics prompted
by recent cases in the Surrogate's Courts that raise (and resolve) issues of
social justice. One is how stringently a court should observe the
requirement that a person seeking to serve as a fiduciaryl in the Surrogate's
Court speak English. The second is a fascinating bridge between federal
immigration law and state guardianship law, where New York judges have
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I A fiduciary is faithful, trustworthy person or a trust company appointed by a court to manage a
decedent's estate or trust or to serve as guardian for a minor child until she reaches 18. The personal
representative of an estate is an executor (for the decedent who died with a will) or an administrator (for
one who died without a will). N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 103(20) (Consol. 2006); N.Y. SURR. CT.
PROC. ACT § 103(2) (Consol. 2010); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (Consol. 2010); N.Y.
SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1001 (Consol. 2010). The executor or administrator disposes of the decedent's
property: that is, pays her debts, expenses and taxes and distributes the rest to her beneficiaries under
her will or the intestacy statute, which gives the estate to the decedent's spouse and children or to other
relatives if no spouse or children survived her. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (Consol.
2010).
Guardianships are governed by N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1701 et seq. (Consol. 2010). A child's
parent is her preferred guardian, see Matter of Thorne, 148 N.E. 630, 631-32 (N.Y. 1925); Matter of
Craig, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 23, 1989, at 27, col. 5 (Sur. Ct. Kings Co.), but in all cases the court appoints the
person who serves the child's best interests. See Matter of LaFountain, 304 N.Y.S.2d 421 (App. Div. 3d
Dep't 1969) (appointing grandparents instead of father).
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been using a statute fashioned for a different reason to confer special
immigrant status on young adults.
I. ENGLISH SKILLS AS PREREQUISITE FOR SERVING AS A FIDUCIARY
A court may refuse to appoint as fiduciary a person who cannot read and
write English. 2 The court's power to appoint a non-English-speaking
fiduciary has been discretionary since the nineteenth century, 3 and no
statute has ever provided guidance to the court on how to exercise its
discretion. Accordingly, some courts have permitted non-English-speaking
persons to serve, and some have refused, the facts of the cases driving the
outcomes. In Matter of Haley,4 for example, the court refused to appoint
the decedent's widow as fiduciary because she could neither speak English
nor count money. In Matter of Santoro,5 the court refused to appoint a
blind fiduciary who could not read or write English, fearing that the
blindness would cause her to delegate her executorial duties, which are
non-delegable, to another. In Matter of Pugarelli,6 the court, finding "no
correlation between intelligence and education," granted letters to the
decedent's widow, who could not read or write English but could speak and
understand it and did not suffer from a "want of understanding." The
widow intended to start a wrongful death lawsuit, and the court noted that
the widow would likely benefit from being the plaintiff.7
Whereas the Surrogate's discretionary power has remained stable for
almost a century and a half, other rights of persons who cannot read or
write English have changed dramatically under federal, state and municipal
2 N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 707(2) (Consol. 2010).
3 See L. 1867, ch. 782, §5; L. 1983, ch. 686, §2612(b), in which the New York legislature gave the
Surrogate the power to refuse to grant letters testamentary, which authorize an executor to perform her
duties see N.Y. SURR. CT PROC. ACT Art. 14 (Consol. 2010), and letters of administration, which
authorize an administrator to perform his duties see N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT Art. 10 (Consol. 2010),
to a person who could not read and write English. See Matter of Haley, 21 Misc. 777 (Sur. Ct. Erie
County 1897) (decedent's widow could not serve because she could neither speak English nor count
money). See also L. 1873, c. 79 (disqualifying a person who was "incompetent ... by reason of...
want of understanding"). The "want of understanding" is still a disqualifying criterion under New York
law. See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 707 (Consol. 2010).
4 Haley, 21 Misc. at 778-79.

5 191 N.Y.S.2d 173 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1959).
6 173 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sur. Ct. Richmond County 1958).
7 The courts sometimes, but not always, favored widows who applied for letters. Compare Matter
of Feciuch, 21 N.Y.S.2d 424 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1940) (holding that letters where the
decedent's daughter alleged that the widow, who could not read or write English, had abandoned the
decedent), and Matter of Cressieri, 176 N.Y.S. 700 (Sur. Ct. New York County 1919) (holding the
widow renounced her right to serve as administrator and the court refused to reinstate her), with Matter
of Bloom, 278 N.Y.S. 157 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1935) (granting the widow letters, though she could
neither speak nor write English, out of deference to widows).

2010]

SOCILJUSTICE JN THE SURROGATES COURT

175

statutes and under case law, especially since the 1960s. 8 For instance, the
Voting Right Acts of 19659 required bilingual ballots for language
minorities. In 1966, the Supreme Court held that New York's literacy tests
effectively denied Puerto Ricans their right to vote.10 In 1974, the Supreme
Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 guarantees a public education
to students with limited English proficiency.11 Federal agencies must
develop systems to help non-English speakers to gain access to their
services.12
Similar changes have occurred in New York State and City. The Court
of Appeals ruled in 2003, for example, that all students are entitled to a
sound education.1 3 The Department of Health and Human Services requires
health-care facilities to provide language assistance to insure that nonEnglish-speaking persons have access. 14 State election workers are required
to help voters with limited English,15 and a non-English-speaking voter can
get help from a relative as she votes.16 The New York City Mayor's office
issued an Executive Order in 200817 requiring all city service agencies to
facilitate meaningful access to their services despite language differences.
In 2006, the New York Unified Court System issued a pamphlet addressing
the language needs of New Yorkers.1 8 All New York public hospitals must
develop programs to ensure that non-English-speaking patients have access
to care. 19
The New York County Surrogate recently plumbed both the ancient
history and the flurry of more recent activities in a case in which a nonEnglish-speaking petitioner sought to be appointed as fiduciary. In Matter
of Toribio,20 a little girl died in an arson fire. Her father sought letters of
administration to commence a wrongful death lawsuit. 2 1 He could neither
8 See generally Cristina M. Rodriguez, Language and Participation,94 CAL. L. REv. 687, 705-06
(2006).
9 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(c) (2010).
10 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
11 Lan v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
12 See Improving Access to Services for Persons With Limited English Proficiency, 65 Fed. Reg.
50121 (Aug. 11, 2000).
13 Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New York, 801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003).
14 Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against
National Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons, 68 Fed. Reg. 4731-02.
15 N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 3-412(l)(a) (Consol. 2010).
16 N.Y. ELEC. LAw § 5-216(2) (Consol. 2010).
17 City of New York Exec. Order No. 120 (July 22, 2008).
18 New York State Unified Court System, CourtInterpretingin New York: A Plan ofAction (April
2006), availableat www.courts.state.ny.us/courtinterpreter/pdfs/actionjplan_040506.pdf
19 10 N.Y. C.R.R. § 405.7(a)(7).
20 885 N.Y.S.2d182 (Sur. Ct. New York County 2009) (decided by Surrogate Kristin Booth Glen).
21 Toribio, 885 N.Y.S.2d at 183. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1(1) (Consol. 2010)
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speak, read nor write English, and the Surrogate could have denied him
letters, but the real question, as the judge saw it, was "whether and how, in
our multi-cultural, multi-lingual society, courts are obligated to maximize
and facilitate participation in the justice system." 22 America, she said, is
experiencing "a sea change ... in our view of immigrants and others who
lack English language competence." 23 She characterized New York City,
36% of whose population was born elsewhere 24 and whose school children
speak 170 languages at home, 25 as "the world city." 2 6
The court granted the decedent's father letters of administration to
commence the wrongful death lawsuit, ruling that "English language
proficiency should not, by itself, prevent appointment as fiduciary." 27
There is a difference between an inability to read or write English and a
"want of understanding" of what it means to serve as a fiduciary. 28 The
disqualifying status should perhaps be illiteracy, rather than a lack of
English language skills.29 The Office of Court Administration provides
interpreters who can translate almost 150 languages. 30 The law favors
family members as fiduciaries, 3 1 and the Surrogate ascertained that the
decedent's father had a satisfactory relationship with his attorney and
would be able to carry out his fiduciary duties. The judge concluded that if
a petitioner for letters is otherwise competent, the court should deny him
fiduciary status "only in those rare situations where no accommodations are
available, or can reasonably be provided, to address any deficiency caused
by lack of English competence." 3 2 "To serve as a fiduciary," she added, "is
(noting that a wrongful death action can be commenced only by a fiduciary: "The personal
representative . . . of a decedent . .. may maintain an action. . .

22 Toribio, 885 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
23 Id. at 184.
24 New York City Department of City Planning, The Newest New Yorkers (2000), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/census/nnyexec sum.shtml.
25 See Leanna Stiefel, Amy Ellen Schwartz & Dylan Conger, Language Proficiency and Home
Languages of Students in New York City Elementary and Middle Schools, TAUB URB. RES. CENTER N.Y. UNIV., availableat http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/
census/nnyexec_sum.shtml.
26 Toribio, 885 N.Y.S.2d at 185 (quoting The Newest New Yorkers, supra note 24).
27 Id at 186. Booth Glen based that generalization on "the commitment of our national, state, and
city governments to provide access to our democratic institutions to non-English speakers, and the
special responsibility and commitment of our court system to provide access and participation to the
institutions of justice." Id at 186.
28 N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 707(l)(e) (Consol. 2010).
29 In support of that proposition, the court pointed to Matter of Pugarelli, 173 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sur.
Ct. Richmond County 1958), discussed supra, note 6.
30 Toribio, 885 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
31 See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1001 (Consol. 2010) (administrators); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC.
ACT § 1418 (Consol. 2010) (administrators c.t.a.).
32 Toribio, 885 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
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one of the last services a family member can perform for a loved one who
has passed away." 33
II. A GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING AS A PREDICATE FOR IMMIGRATION
STATUS

Immigrants were also the catalyst for a bold judicial decision in Matter
of KB,34 where the Surrogate used her jurisdiction over an adult immigrant
as a predicate for conferring upon her a special immigrant status. Other
courts have followed suit, 3 5 and the Appellate Division has reversed the
decisions of the lower courts that have declined to do.36
KB was a child from the Republic of Trinidad. After her mother
contracted cancer, mother and child 37 moved to New York to stay with
KB's grandmother. The cancer treatments failed, the mother died in New
York, and KB remained with her grandmother. She prospered, excelled in
high school, and was offered partial scholarships to college. Because she
was undocumented, however, she could not apply for financial aid, and
because she did not have a social security number, she could not get a job.
Federal law has created a category of immigrant with "Special Juvenile
Immigrant Status" 38 ("SJIS"), which can be granted when an alien "has
been declared dependent on a juvenile court," 39 if a judge decides that "the
child's reunification with one or both parents is not viable due to abuse,
neglect [or] abandonment" and that it "would not be in the alien's best
interests to be returned to the alien's or parent's previous country of
nationality . . . ."40
A juvenile court is a United States court that has jurisdiction to
determine the custody and care of juveniles. State law determines this
jurisdiction. In New York, the Surrogate's Court has jurisdiction over the

33 Id. at 186.
34 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 25, 2008, at 19, col. 1 (Sur. Ct. Kings County).
35 See Matter of M.C., N.Y.L.J., March 4, 2010, at 25, col. 3 (Sur. Ct. Suffolk County); Matter of
Dwight A., N.Y.L.J., Jan. 2, 2009, at 43, col. 3 (Sur. Ct. Kings County).
36 See Trudy-Ann W. v. Joan W., 73 A.D.3d 792, 901 N.Y.S.2d 296 (2d Dep't 2010); Jisun L. v.
Young Sun P., 2010 WL 2674441 (N.Y.A.D. 2d Dep't 2010); Matter of Antowa McD., 50 A.D.3d 507,
856 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1st Dep't 2008).
37 Matter of K.B., N.Y.L.J., Aug. 25, 2008, at 19, col. 1 (Sur. Ct. Kings County) (KB's father had
abandoned the family).
38 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(27)(J) (2010); Aliens and Nationality, 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a) (2010).
39 Aliens and Nationality, 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a) (2010).
40 8 U.S.C. § I l01(a)(27)(J)(ii) (2010). Before 2008, the petitioner had to prove that she was
"deemed eligible for long-term foster care due to abuse, neglect or abandonment." 8 U.S.C. §
I 101(a)(27)(J)(i) (amended by Pub. L. No. 110-457 (2008)).

178

JOURNALOFCIVILRIGH7Sl& ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT [Vol.25:1

person and property of an infant,4 1 defined as a person under 18.42 If an
infant meets the federal requirements (that he is not returnable to his
parents and that it does not serve his best interests to return to his
homeland), the court can confer SJIS on him. 43 Had KB been an infant, she
could have been "declared dependent on" the Surrogate's Court, which
would have permitted her to petition for SJIS.44
The federal statute and regulations do not specify that the alien must be
under 18, but rather that she be "dependent on a juvenile court." Until
2006, the Surrogate's Court had jurisdiction over a child only until she
reached the age of 18. Once she turned 18, the guardianship terminated. If
a person over 18 petitioned for a guardian, the court had no power to
appoint one.
In 2006, a development arose in New York that had nothing to do with
SJIS issues. Certain hard-to-place adopted children qualify for adoption
subsidies, which ordinarily continue until the child turns 21. Before 2006,
if such an adopted child's parents died after she reached 18, the subsidies
would stop. The legislature therefore amended Social Services Law §45345
to allow adoption-subsidy payments to continue until age 21 even if the
child's parents had died. A problem persisted, however. One of the
persons who could petition for those benefits was the child's legal
guardian, and because guardianships lasted only until the child turned 18,
the adopted child between the ages of 18 and 21 could lose her benefits.
When the legislature amended Social Services Law §453, therefore, it
simultaneously amended SCPA 1707 to permit a child between the ages of
18 and 21 to petition for a guardian. Two years later it made the same rule
for the Family Court. 4 6
The court predicated its jurisdiction over a guardianship proceeding for
Ms. KB on those amendments. The Surrogate's Court was now the
"juvenile court" upon whom KB was dependent; the federal statute was

41 N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1701 (Consol. 2010).
42 N.Y. EST. POWERS &TRUSTS LAW § 1-2.9-a (Consol. 2010).
43 See, e.g., Matter of M.C., N.Y.L.J., Mar. 4, 2010, at 25, col. 3 (Sur. Ct. Suffolk County).
44 See Matter of Antowa McD., 50 A.D.3d 507, 856 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1st Dep't 2008).
45 2006 N.Y. Laws 518, §1. Under certain circumstances where the Department of Social Services
deems the 18-21-year-old adopted child responsible enough, the payment can be made directly to him,
or to a payee designated by the D.S.S. for his benefit. Id
46 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §661 (Consol. 2010) (as amended by 2008 N.Y. Laws 404, § 4). Before
2008, the Family Court lacked jurisdiction of minors between the ages of 18 and 21, and the court in
Matter of Vanessa D., 858 N.Y.S.2d 687 (2d Dep't 2008), denied the guardianship petition. The 2008
amendment gave the Family Court concurrent jurisdiction with the Surrogate's Court over guardianship
proceedings for persons between 18 and 21. Memorandum in Support, 2008 McKinney's Sessions Laws
of New York at 2329-30.
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triggered; and the court was able to examine the facts and determine that
Ms. KB's father had abandoned her and that returning her to Trinidad,
where she knew no one, would not serve her best interests. 47
The 2006 amendments to the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act and
Social Services Law and to the Family Court Act in 2008 were intended to
help adopted children when their parents died and their adoption subsidy
funds dried up. 4 8 These amendments were not intended to deal with matters
of immigration. 49 However, when it debated the 2006 and 2008
amendments, the legislature knew that the loss of that adoption-subsidy
money for the 18-21 year old could "have long-term consequences for [her]
career prospects and/or educational opportunities," language that precisely
states Ms. K.B's plight and the rationale for allowing her Special Juvenile
Immigrant Status.
CONCLUSION

The law of Trusts & Estates seems staid and stolid. It deals with people,
however: a constant stream of people from the current of society who face
life and death questions. It is no surprise, therefore, that the issues facing
that society surface in the Surrogate's Courts. In Toribio and KB, and the
cases that followed them, the judges have, with creativity and agility,
served justice.

47 Accord, Jisun L. v. Young Sun P., 2010 WL 2674441 (N.Y.S.D. 2d Dep't 2010); Matter of
Dwight A., N.Y.L.J., Jan. 2, 2009, at 43, col. 3 (Sur. Ct. Kings County). For a Family Court case
granting SJIS, see Delmi Y. v. Carmen Y., 886 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Fam. Ct. Nassau County 2009).
48 See Memorandum in Support, 2006 McKinney's Sessions Laws of New York at 1995-96 (the
amendment "allow[s] the payments to continue when a child loses one or both adoptive parents").
49 In fact, at least one court granting SJIS has noted that state courts have no jurisdiction over
immigration issues, and that although "the juvenile court is placed in a unique position to affect
immigration proceedings normally within the exclusive domain of the federal courts . . .," it described
its role as solely "to make determinations which are in the best interests of the child and in the case of a
request for 'special findings', to determine if the requisite elements of 8 U.S.C.A. §1l01(a)(27)(J)(i)
apply." Matter of M.C., N.Y.L.J., March 4, 2010, at 25, col. 3 (Sur. Ct. Suffolk County).

